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RECENT CASES
liability on the contract. A majority of the United States Courts hold the
infant liable on the theory that the action is one purely in tort, independent
of the contract. 0
The general rule, in the absence of statute,1 0 is that the doctrine of
estoppel has no application to infants." In other jurisdictions
12 including
the State of Georgia,13 the courts have not strictly adhered to this rule and
have held that fraudulent misrepresentations by the infant regarding his
majority will estop him from setting up his disability where the other party
to the contract has acted in good faith and without negligence.
Modem conditions have brought infants into trade and commerce to an
extent not contemplated when the common law doctrine regarding infancy
originated. In attempting to promote greater freedom in commercial tran-
sactions and in recognizing that most infants who are artful enough to suc-
cessfully practice (such subterfuge as fraud) are also of sufficient intelli-
gence to be charged with the contractual responsibilities of their deceit,
many courts have devised different theories to hold the infant responsible.
Some states hold the infant liable in tort for his fraud in the inducement of
the contract 14 while others apply the doctrine of estoppel to preclude his
plea of minority.' 5 Some courts allow the infant to rescind but require him
to reimburse the seller for depreciation and use of the property while in his
possession.'" Still others by statute, require an infant above the age of 18
years to restore the consideration or its value as a condition precedent to
rescission.
17
The result of the instant case, although following the minority view,
appears preferrable in the light of reason and logic since it prevents the
shield of infancy from being used as a sword.
WALTER AURAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - RIGHT OF FREE Associ-
ATION AND RIGHT TO WORK LAWS* - On suit of plaintiff non-union railroad
employees, the District Court enjoined the defendant railroad and defendant
labor organizations from executing union shop agreements permitted by, the
9. E.g., Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 420 (1886); Wisconsin Loan & Finance
Corp. v. Goodnough, 201 Wisc. 101, 228 N.W. 484 (1930).
10. E.g., Iowa Code § 599.3 (1950), Friar v. Rae-Chandler Co., 192 Ia. 427,
185 N.W. 32 (1921); Kansas Gen.Stat. § 38-103 (1949), Dillian v. Burnham,
43 Kan. 77, 22 Pac. 1016 (1890); Wash. Rev. Stat. § 5830 (1922); Thosaath v. Trans-
port Motor Co., 136 Wash. 565, 240 Pac. 921 (1925).
11. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927); Simo v. Everhardt, 102 U.S.
300, 313 (1880) (dictum).
12. E.g., County Board of Education v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S.W. 63 (1912);
Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921); LaRosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L.
375, 105 AtI. 201 (1918); Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 17 S.W.2d 8 (1929).
13. Clemens v. Olshine, 54 Ga.App. 290, 187 S.E. 711 (1936); Hood v. Duren,
33 Ga. App. 203, 125 SE. 787 (1924).
14. See not 9 supra.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927); Murdock v. Fisher Finance
Corp., 51 Cal.App. 372, 251 Pac. 319 (1926).
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 35-37, Murdock v. Fisher Finance Corp., 51 Cal.App. 372,
251 Pac. 319 (1926); N.D. Rev. Code § 14-1011 (1943), In Re Campbells Guardianship.
56 N.D. 60, 215 N.W. 913 (1927); Easement v. Callaghan, 35 N.D. 27, 159 N.W. 77
(1916); S.D. Code § 43.0105 (1939).
* Subsequent to the preparation of this paper, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted an appeal to the defendants in this case. As yet, no decision has been
rendered by them.
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Federal Railway Labor Act,' but prohibited by the state constitution.2 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska in affirming the lower court's denial of the De-
fendant's motion for a new trial held that §152(11) of the Federal Railway
Labor Act is unconstitutional. Since Article XV of the Nebraska Constitution
provides that no person shall be denied employment because of membership
or nonmembership in a union organization, and since any union shop agree-
ments involving railroads in that state would therefore depend for their
validity upon §152(11) of the Federal Railway Labor Act, such depend-
ence would be governmental action within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and violative of the First Amendment which
guarantees the right of free association. Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry., 160
Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
Congress in the execution of its power over interstate commerce may regu-
late the relations of railroads and their employees while they are engaged
in interstate commerce, subject always to the limitations prescribed by the
Constitution and to the qualification that the regulations must have a real or
substantial connection with the interstate commerce in which the employees
are engaged.1 Pursuant to this authority Congress on January 10, 1951
amended the Railway Labor Act to "permit" employers and union organi-
zations to enter into agreements whereby union membership could be re-
quired as a condition of continued employment notwithstanding any state
law to the contrary. 4 Prior to this amendment, union shops were not per-
mitted by the Railway Labor Act.
5
In the absence of statutory prohibition, labor-management contracts re-
quiring union membership as a condition of continued employment have
been upheld by courts which based their decision on the employer's freedom
of contract.6 The early cases of Adair v. United States, 7 and Coppage v.
Kansas,8 in holding invalid statutes outlawing "yellow dog" contracts, stated
that an employer's freedom of contract enables him to discriminate against
union members. This position has since been abandoned and the right of
workers to organize and to bargain collectively without fear of discrimina-
tion by employers is now universally recognized.9 Paradoxically, the em-
ployers right to freedom of contract which was at one time used to justify
contracts prohibiting workers from joining a union, has now been used to
justify contracts compelling workers to join a union.
Eighteen states, however, have enacted various legislation generally known
as "Right to Work" Laws which have outlawed union shops. In general
these laws provide that no employer shall deny any person employment be-
1. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. §152(11).
2. Neb. Const. art. 15, §13.
3. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 48, 49 (1912) (dictum).
4. Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 256, 540 (1955) (dictum).
5. Id. at 533.
6. International Ass'n of Machinists v. State, 153 Fla. 672, 15 So.2d 485 (1943); Jacobs
v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.Supp. 854, 76 N.E.5 (1905). Contra, Barnes v. Berry, 156 Fed. 72
(6th Cir. 1907); Curren v. Galen, 28 N.Y.Supp. 1134, 46 N.E. 297 (Ct. of Appeals 1897).
7. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
8. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
9. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Inc., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trade Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (dictum).
10. Benewitz, Nature and Effect of State Right to Work Laws, 1 Wayne L.Rev. 165
(1955), (the states as cited 'are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virgina). See N.D. Const. art. I §23.
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cause of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization. 1  Prior to
the 1951 Amendment to the Railway Labor Act, the validity of state "Right
to Work" laws was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.12
Presumably this holding would also govern labor agreements involving in-
terstate commerce where Congress had not acted since, in the absence of
congressional legislation on the subject, state laws which are not regulations
of the interstate commerce itself or its instrumentalities are not forbidden
even though they affect interstate commerce.
13
Recently the Supreme Court of Texas, acting upon facts identical with
those in the instant case, upheld the validity of the Federal statute and de-
clared it to be controlling over that state's "Right to Work" laws in areas of
conflict.14 The case may be criticized, however, on the grounds that the court
apparently assumed its conclusion by stating as an initial premise that
§152(11) is a valid exercise of the commerce power of Congress.15 It would
seem that whether the statute was a valid exercise of the commerce power
would depend upon whether it had the effect of denying constitutional
rights. Right of free association was not raised in the Texas case, but viola-
tion of other First Amendment rights was considered as was the violation of
rights under the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments. In re-
versing the lower court's decision, the court said that to strike down alleged
violations of the first ten amendments, it was a condition precedent that
"governmental action" be found, but that no governmental action was taken
on the behalf of unions by the amendment of §152(11). In denying the
alleged violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Texas court also stated
that there was no governmental action because the statute was "permissive"
in nature, and further that the ultimate execution of the contract, which the
unions could lawfully negotiate because of their fundamental right to col-
lective bargaining, was left solely to the union and the employer.'a From
this it might be implied that had the statute been directive rather than
permissive it would be unconstitutional. In other words, what it permitted
by indirection is prohibited by direction.
This instant case argues convincingly that where a union shop agreement
relies upon a Federal statute for its validity, the Federal statute amounts to
"governmental action" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 17 Furthermore, the Nebraska court takes the position that
since Nebraska has a "Right to Work" law, a union shop contract may not
depend for its validity upon the right of collective bargaining, but instead,
must look to the Federal statute. Once it is found that there is governmental
action, the determining factor would then become whether the governmental
action has the effect of denying an individaul his constitutional rights. Or, as
in the instant case, does an individual have the right to work without being
required to join a union?
11. Id. at 168.
12. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949); Whitaker v. North Carolina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
13. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 341 (1951).
14. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandsherry, 277 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
15. Id. at 779.
16. Id. at 780.
17. Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry., supra note.4 at 546. (An argument might be made "hat
whenever enforcement of a union shop contract is attempted in Federal court, it would
also be "governmental action".) Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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The issue is a controversial one. Advocates of union security say that
an employee's right to work is always conditioned by such reasonable re-
quirements as an employer may wish to impose (i.e. loyalty, punctuality, in-
dustry), and that union membership is one such reasonable and necessary
requirement. They also argue that since all employees share the benefits of
collective bargaining, all employees should share the attendent expense.' 8
In rebuttal, proponents of the open shop admit that an employer should
be free to impose reasonable conditions of employment, but they insist that
in most cases the requirement of union membership represents a condition
which the union has coerced the employer to impose under pressure of col-
lective bargaining. Moreover, while agreeing that it is reasonable to require
all employees to share in the expense of collective bargaining, they contend
that. union membership means much more. It includes supporting not only
the economic and political ideals of the union, but also strike benefits, in-
surance and many other things which an individual may not wish to support.
It may be significant to observe that only public rights are superior to
private rights, and only where there is great necessity and an appreciably
greater resulting benefit may be abridgement of private rights be justified.20
It is questionable whether union shop agreements meet these requirments.
Although the right of free association is not spelled out by the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution, it would seem to be a necessary corralary of the
freedom of religion and peaceable assembly. 2t It may be argued that union
shop agreements in themselves do not violate the right of free association
since the employee is free to sever his employment relationship rather than
join the union. While technically this may be true, as a practical matter ,ew
employees would reject the condition of union membership where the alter-
native would be unemployment. This it could well be in highly industrial-
ized areas where union shops are the rule. In a recent address to the Ameri-
can Bar Association Convention, England's Lord Justice Denning,
Lord Justice of Appeal cited the closed shop2 2 as an illustration of
an abuse to the individual's right to freedom of association. He stated that
in England the chairman of the Trade Union Congress recently said, "We
cannot face the men with the alternative, belong or starve." 2a In the United
States, union shops have been declared illegal where the employer hired the
majority of the workers in the community, with the effect of making unem-
ployment an alternative to union membership2
4
It is to be noted that the United States was among those members of the
United Nations General Assembly which unanimously adopted Article 20 of
the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" which provides that, "No one
may be compelled to belong to an association." 25 It is difficult to reconcile
18. Bznewitz, op. cit. atpra note 10 at 177, 178.
19. Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry., supra note 4 at 547.
20. Cf. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21. Denning, The Price of Freedom, 41 A.B A.J. 1012 (1955).
22. Closed shop contracts require that the worker belong to the union before being
hired, while union shop contracts require that the worker join the union within a short
period of time after he has been hired. Both forms of contracts require union membership
as a condition of continued employment so that for purposes of this paper there would
seem to be little, if any difference between the two.
23. Denning, op. cit. supra note 21 at 1013.
24. Curran v. Galen, 28 N.Y. Supp. 1134, 46 N.E. 297, (1897).
25. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 3 Sess., Plenary, Part I, p. 71 (1948) (1948
UN Yearbook 467).
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this. with §152(11) of the Railway Labor Act which would permit agree-
ments compelling workers to join a union as a condition of continued em-
ployment.
It would seem that employers, who may not legally discriminate against
union members, should also be prohibited from discriminating against non-
union workers. The "right to organize" becomes in effect compulsion to
organize under a union shop agreement. A right ceases to be a right, where
it must be exercised in any event.
Perhaps the most powerful denouncement of the closed shop was made in
a dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter who cited with approval a great exponent
or organized labor, Mr. Justice Brandeis as saying, "But the American people
should not, and will not accept unionism if it involves the closed shop. They will




CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMINENT DOMAIN - VALUE TO OWNER AS BASIS
FOR COMPENSATION - Plaintiff, the owner of a leasehold interest in property
sought to be condemned by defendant, city housing authority, instituted pro-
ceedings to recover the market value of such interest. The defendant appealed
from the trial court's charge to the jury that the Georgia constitutiont did
not require the use of the fair market value of the leasehold interest as the
basis for determining just compensation; that the just and adequate compen-
sation to which an owner is entitled is the value of property to him, not to
a condemner, and that the measure of damages is not necessarily the market
value of property, but may be the fair and reasonable value thereof. On
appeal it was held, two justices dissenting, that the charge correctly stated
the law as to the proper measure of compensation. Housing Authority Of
Savannah v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, 87 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1955).
It is universally held that property shall not be taken for a public purpose
without the payment of "just compensation." 2 The Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution expressly imposes this limitation on the power of Con-
gress, and the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to impose a similar limitation on the power of all the states.
3 Most of
the states have a "just compensation" clause in their own constitutions.
4
"Just compensation" means "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken" and that "the owner is to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken".6
26. AFL v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 551 (1949) (dissent).
1. Ga. Const. Art 1 § 3 par. 1. "Private property can not be taken or damaged lor
public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid."
2. United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933); Campbell v.
Chase National Bank of New York, 5 F.Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. U933) (dictum).
3. McCoy v. Union Elevator Railroad Company, 247 U.S. 354 (1918); Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
4. The interpretation of the constitutional provision in the instant case may well
find reception throughout the country since a similar clause is contained in the constitution
of all but tvo states, North Carolina and New Hampshire.See Staton v. Norfolk, 111 N.C.
278, .16 S.E. 181 (1892) where the court read this requirement into the North Carolina
Constitution by implication under the due process clause.
5. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
6. Ibid.
